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TOM HANSEN:

Plaintiff

—

Appellant

DOUGLAS A. HILTON:

Plaintiff

-

Appellant

MIKE MACKINTOSH:

Plaintiff

-

Appellant

BRUCE SILCOX:

Plaintiff

-

Appellant

RUSSEL VICKERS:

Plaintiff

-

Appellant

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY:

Defendant

-

Respondent

ROGER BARRUS:

Defendant

-

Respondent

ROGER MORRIS (MORSE):

Defendant

-

Respondent

CCI MECHANICAL, INC.*:

Third-Party Defendant

*CCI,

although

named

as

a

Third-Party

Defendant,

did

not

participate in the precedings below and does not participate in
this appeal.
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III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal of an Order granting Summary Judgment in favor
of Defendants - Appellees in the Third District Court of the
State

of

presiding.
appeal

Utah,

Salt

Lake

County,

Judge

James

S.

Sawaya,

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

amended.

1

§78-2-2(3)(j)

(1953)

as

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this matter are:
A.

Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether

Appellants

suffered

a

compensable

personal

injury?
B.

Whether the immediate injuries suffered by Appellants
was sufficient

to entitle them to compensation for

those injuries and for emotional distress?
C.

Whether

Appellants

should

be

entitled

to

medical

surveillance damages due to their exposure to asbestos?

2

V.
DETERMINATIVE RULE: RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The determinative rule in this case is Rule 56(b) of the Utah
fl

(b) A party against

whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim

is asserted or a

Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
as to all or any part thereof•"

3

VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On February 10, 1989 the Appellants filed suit, seeking

damages on six causes of action including:

Common Law Fraud,

Negligence,

Strict

Misrepresentation,

Intentional

Infliction

Liability,
of

Disregard/Punitive Damages.

Negligent

Emotional

Distress

and

Reckless

(Complaint at Para. 35-61) (R.008-

015) .
2.

On February 22, 1990, the Defendants filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Appellants1 causes
of action with prejudice.

On May 21, 1990 that motion was

granted by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Court Judge.
(R.546) (R.541).
3.

The Appellants1 Complaint was dismissed with prejudice

on the ground that no bodily injury had been manifested in any
Appellant, however, Appellants were granted leave to re-file a
complaint in the event that a bodily injury manifested itself in
the future.

(R.547)

Plaintiffs Hansen, Hilton, Mackintosh,

Silcox and Vickers hereby appeal said judgment.

4

VII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During July, 1986 through November 1986, and for all

relevant periods, Appellants Tom Hansen, Douglas A. Hilton, Mike
Mackintosh, Bruce Silcox and Russell Vickers were employed by CCI
Mechanical, Inc.

CCI had contracted with Defendant Mountain Fuel

Supply to perform renovation work for what is called a total
energy project in the basement of Mountain Fuel's downtown Salt
Lake office site.
2.

(Complaint at Para. 12.) (R.004).

This energy project included the re-routing of asbestos

insulated piping and equipment from an old set of turbines to a
new set of turbines.

This work was performed

ventilated, enclosed basement area.

in a poorly

(Complaint at Para. 14.)

(R.005).
3.

During the course of this work, in or about the end of

August, 1986, brick insulation was removed from a breaching in
the basement area, and thrown into a pile nearby; it was then
moved and stacked in an adjacent walkway area.
41.)

(Hansen Depo. at

(Exhibit MB") (R.450).
4.

When the Appellants first observed the insulation, they

expressed concern as to its composition to CCI foreman Mike
Mackintosh.
asked

In or about the end of August, 1986, Mr. Mackintosh

Defendant Roger Morris

asbestos.

Mr. Morris

if the

replied

that

insulation material was
the

insulation was not

asbestos, that it was in fact calcium silicate, and that all of
the asbestos in the area had been removed seven years prior.
5

(Hilton Depo. at 60-61.)
35.)

(Exhibit

ff ff

E .)

(Mackintosh Depo. at

(Exhibit "A") (R.441), (Complaint at Para. 21) (R.006).
5.

stacking

Subsequent
in

the

to

area

the
of

removal

the

of

the

breaching, the

insulation

and

insulation was

inadvertently crushed and tracked throughout the area by workers.
(Silcox Depo. at 81.)
6.

(Exhibit "E".) (R.476).

For the following six weeks to two months, Plaintiffs

worked in the area where the insulation was stored, continually
walking though it, crawling over it and inhaling the dust from
it.

(Hansen Depo. at 44.)
7.

(Exhibit "B".) (R.449).

One weekend in September, 1986, the plant was shut down

and all ventilation to the area of the breaching and crushed
insulation was cut off.

(Mackintosh Depo. at 30.)

(Exhibit

M ,f

A .) (R.440) .
8.

During this period of shutdown, the insulation, which

had been reduced to a powdery substance, was airborne and the
area looked like M a dust storm11.

The dust was so thick that the

workers could taste it and had to take periodic breaks just to
clean

it out of their noses and mouths

(Hilton

Depo.

at

79,

81.)

(Exhibit

and get fresh air.
"E".)

(R.476, 477),

(Complaint at 23, 24, 27) (R.006).
9.
basement

At this time, and throughout their exposures in the
area,

all

of

the

Plaintiffs

suffered

coughing,

respiratory distress, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye
irritation.

(Hilton Depo. at 31. (Exhibit "E") (R.475), (Vickers

Depo. at 34.)

(Exhibit

M

C H .)

(R.458),
6

(Hansen Depo. at 18.)

(Exhibit

M lf

B .)

(R.448),

(Silcox Depo. at 32.)

(Exhibit

lf

D".)

(R.468), (Complaint at 34.) (R.008).
10.
Appellant

Toward the end of October or early November, 1986,
Vickers

again pointed

out the insulating material,

which had been scattered about the premises, to Defendant Roger
Barrus, safety director for Mountain Fuel, and expressed concern
that the material might be asbestos.
(Exhibit "C".) (R.459),

(Vickers Depo. at 51)

(Responses to Plaintiffs1 First Set of

Interrogatories to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company No.
19.)

(Exhibit
11.

,f M

F .) (R.483).

Mr. Barrus had the material tested, and reported that

the material did, in fact, contain 60-65% amosite asbestos and
less than 1% chrysotile asbestos.

(Responses to Plaintiffs1

First Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply
Company No. 20) (Exhibit "F") (R.483) (Complaint at Para. 29)
(R.007).

Vickers immediately approached Defendant Morris about

the presence of the asbestos at the renovation site and Morris
once again denied that any asbestos was present.

Morris became

very upset when informed about Barrus1 finding of asbestos and
severely

reprimanded

Vickers

for

consulting

with

Barrus,

indicating that completion of the renovation project would now be
delayed and Mountain Fuel would risk losing a tax credit if the
project was not completed on schedule.

(Complaint at 30, 31)

(R.007).
12.

Subsequently, the asbestos was removed from the project

by Power-master, Inc.

(Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of
7

Interrogatories to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company No.
22.)

(Exhibit "F") (R.483)
13.

Since the time of the Appellants1

exposure to the

insulation containing asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site, each
has suffered from severe anxiety associated with the uncertainty
of

their

future

undergoing

medical

periodic

condition, and

testing

for

they

asbestos

all

anticipate

related

disease.

(Complaint at Para. 40, 46, 59) (R.010), (Hilton Depo. at 36-37)
(R.266-267), (Plaintiff Hilton's Response to Defendants1 First
Set of Interrogatories No. 26) (R.481-482), (Hilton Depo. at 31)
(R.263), (Plaintiff Vickers1 Responses to Defendants1 First Set
of Interrogatories No. 26.) (Exhibit "C") (R.461-462), (Vickers
Depo. at 38-39)

(R.324-325),

(Plaintiff Hansen's Responses to

Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories No. 26.)

(Exhibit "B")

(R.451-452), (Hansen Depo. at 21-22) (R.245, 446), (Silcox Depo.
at 40; Plaintiff Silcox's Responses to Defendants' First Set of
Interrogatories
Mackintosh's

No.

26.)

Responses

Interrogatories No. 26.)

(Exhibit
to

"D")

(R.471),

Defendant's

(Exhibit "A")

(Plaintiff

First

(R.443),

Set

of

(Mackintosh

Depo. at 73) (Exhibit "A") (R.442).
14.

In addition, Appellant Vickers continues to suffer from

wheezing and shortness of breath,

Appellant Hansen continues to

suffer from shortness of breath and increased susceptibility to
chest

colds, and

Appellant

Silcox

continues

to

suffer

from

congestion, coughing and shortness of breath, all due to exposure
to the insulation containing asbestos.
8

(Vickers Depo at Para.

34) (Exhibit "C") (R.458),

(Hansen Depo. at 18) (Exhibit "B")

(R.448), (Silcox Depo. at 32) (Exhibit "D") (R.468).

VIII.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this case, Mountain Fuel Supply Company knew, or
should have known of the presence of toxic asbestos in their
building.

Mountain

Fuel

hired

sub-contractors

employer) to renovate their building.

(Appellants'

The renovation required

that Appellants remove and work with asbestos in a confined
basement area.
the

dust

When the Apellants inquired about the contents of

they

were

constantly

exposed

to,

Mountain

Fuel

carelessly told them that the substance was a benign calcium
silicate.
The

Appellants

became

nauseated

and

began

coughing

developing various chest, eye and throat irritations.
problems worsened as the project continued.

and

These

Appellants continued

to breathe the asbestos dust over a two month period.

Appellants

finally confirmed that their workplace was indeed contaminated
with high concentrations of asbestos.
Appellants contend that their exposure to toxic asbestos is
a present injury.
immediate

Additionally, Appellants contend that their

symptoms,

e.g.

coughing,

eye,

nose

and

throat

irritation and nausea were also immediate, compensable injuries
justifying compensation.
The

long-term

health

exposure are grim.
related

disease

problems

associated

Because of the uncertainty
and

death,

Appellants

suffering from emotional distress.
10

are

with

asbestos

of asbestosunderstandably

This distress is clearly and

unmistakably due to their exposure to asbestos at the Mountain
Fuel site.

Consequently, Appellants seek compensation for their

emotional distress.
Appellants further contend that Mountain Fuel should be held
responsible for the costs of monitoring the potential disease
processes in each Appellant as a result of their exposure to
asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site.
toxic

exposure

victims

compensatory item.

is

The medical monitoring of

necessary

and

recognized

as

a

Most courts award medical monitoring damages

to help the victim mitigate the damages caused by toxic exposure.
Numerous

issues

of

material

fact

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

exist

precluding

Such issues of fact

include the extent of Appellants1 injuries, the extent of their
emotional distress and the reasonableness thereof, the degree of
exposure to asbestos and the Appellants' increased risk of future
asbestos-related

disease

and

the

necessity

for

medical

monitoring.
Appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court
reverse the judgment of the Third District Court and remand this
case for further proceedings.

11

IX.
ARGUMENT
I.

ASBESTOS AND ITS RELATED DISEASES
In

the

asbestos-related

United

is

one

Medical

occupational
occurring

construction

asbestos

substance known.

fibrous

mineral

industry.

hour.

that

Litigation, 10 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 393, 396 (1985).
noted

every

estimated

Asbestos

have

occurs

it

Note,

commentators

death

States

as

Id.

silicate

the

Asbestos
used

most

hazardous

is a naturally

principally

in

the

It is synonymous with insulation and

cement products which comprise greater than 50% of the asbestos
market.

L. Parmeggiani, Encyclopedia Of Occupational Health and

Safety 185, 187 (3rd Ed. 1983).

The danger from the mineral

arises from exposure to the finite dust particles.

These fibrous

silicates are so small as to be detectable only by an electron
microscope.

Id. at 186.

Once inhaled the asbestos fibers enter

the lung and become trapped forever causing scarring of the lung
and initiating the process from which asbestos-related diseases
result.

4 L. Gordy & R. Gray, Attorneys1 Textbook of Medicine,

205C.11(2) (Apr. 1980).
The threshold

level

of exposure

required

to trigger an

asbestos related disease is unknown. L. Parmeggiani, supra, at
185-195.

The courts have recognized "evidence which indicates

that short periods of exposure-from one day to three months-can
cause significant damage to the lungs".
12

Schultz v. Keene Corp.

729 F.Supp. 609, 615 (N.D.Ill.1990).

"The length of time that an

individual was exposed to asbestos does not in itself determine
how serious the injury will be.
individual

idiosyncrasy,

the

Several factors, including

intensity

of

exposure, and the

nature of the contaminant all play a part in the development of
the disease"

Id. at 609 citing Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus,

Inc. , 118 111.2d 23, 37, 112 111.Dec. 684, 690, 514 N.E.2d 150,
156 (1987).

The Fifth Circuit Court also recognized the dangers

of any asbestos exposure when it stated that, "any exposure to
asbestos, even to a relatively minute amount, can precipitate the
development

of

an

asbestos

related

disease."

Jackson

V.

Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d 1314, 1336 (5th Cir. 1985) (en Banc).
The three primary diseases which are directly associated
with

asbestos

exposure

are

lung

cancer,

asbestosis,

and

mesothelioma. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1082-83

(5th cir.1973), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95

S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974).
conducted
asbestos

since

At least 17 major studies

1955 have confirmed the relationship between

exposure

and

lung

or bronchial

cancer.

Becklake,

Asbestos-Related Diseases of the Lungs and Pluera, 126 Am. Rv.
Resp. Dis. 187, 188 (1982).

Lung cancer, of course, is virtually

incurable. Id. at 189.
Asbestosis is defined as fibrosis of the lung caused by
asbestos fibers. Asbestosis is one of the three primary asbestos
related
asbestos.

diseases

and

results

exclusively

from

exposure

4 L. Gordy & R. Gray, supra, at 205C.11(2).
13

to

When

asbestos fibers enter the lung they become trapped and scar the
lung.

Id..

at

205C. 40-42.

Once

inhaled,

the

body's

clearance-defense mechanism encases the invading asbestos dust
fibers to protect the lung.

This process results in a reduction

of the limited surface area in which the carbon-doxide exchange
takes place.

As the surface area decreases the victim develops

external signs of shortness of breath, wheezing and the inability
to carry on normal activities.

Id.

No known medical treatment

exists for removing the fibers or scarred sections of the lung.
Id.

Certainty

radiograph
expiration.
between

and

of

the

tests

diagnosis
measuring

is

confirmed

by

lung

capacity

and

Asbestosis is frequently fatal.

asbestosis

and

cancer may

be

a

chest

maximum

The correlation

as high

as

50%.

L.

arising

from

the

Parmeggiani, supra, at 190.
Mesothelioma

is

a

cancerous

tumor

mesothelial cells in the chest, stomach and heart.
R. Gray, supra at 205C.72.

4 L. Gordy &

The diagnosis for mesothelioma is

difficult since the symptoms for asbestosis and mesothelioma are
identical.

Diagnosis often requires biopsy

of a surgically

removed piece of tissue to distinguish it from asbestosis.

Once

diagnosed, it is uniformly fatal. Id. "Most patients survive for
less than one year after a diagnosis."

Mossman & Gee, Asbestos

Related Diseases, 320 New Eng. J. Med. 1721, 1723;

Locke v.

Johns-Manville Corp.. 275 SE.2d 900, 903 (Va. 1981).
Another critical factor in asbestos-related diseases is the
long latency period between impact/exposure and the diagnosis of
14

the disease.

Asbestosis is detectable as early as 4 years after

exposure, but generally has a latency period of 15 to 20 years.
Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 434f 346 (Mo. 1984).
Mesothelioma has a latency period of "35 to 40 years, with most
deaths occurring in patients over 60 years of age."
Gee, supra, at 1723.

Mossman &

This prolonged and unpredictable latency

period adds to the insidious nature of the asbestos exposure and
disease process.
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II. A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER
APPELLANTS SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE PERSONAL INJURY.
The Appellants claim to have suffered a compensable
injury.

It is not disputed that Appellants were exposed to large

quantities of asbestos fibers at the Mountain Fuel site.

The

inhalation of toxic asbestos fibers has resulted in the invasion
of

Appellants1

legally

protected

interests

and

a

physical

The Appellants1 exposure to asbestos

invasion of their bodies.

is an "injury11 that is actionable if inflicted by a private
person.

"Injury" is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts

§7(1) (1965) as "the invasion of any legally protected interest
of another."

The Appellants have a legally protected interest in

avoiding the inhalation of toxic asbestos fibers, the emotional
distress caused by the fear of a potentially fatal disease, and
the associated medical expenses necessary to monitor the disease
process.
In the case of Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557,
525 A.2d 287 (1987), the New Jersey Court wrote:
The word 'injury1 is used... to denote the fact
that there has been an invasion of a legally protected
interest which, if it were the legal consequence of a
tortious act, would entitle the person suffering the
invasion to maintain the action of tort. ...The most
usual form of injury is the infliction of some harm,
but there may be an injury although no harm is done.
In our view, an enhanced risk of disease caused by
significant exposure to toxic chemicals is clearly an
injury under the act.
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 304-05

(Citations omitted).

In the same

opinion, Justice Handler, concurring in part and dissenting in
part,

writes,

"it

is

self-evident
16

that

exposure

to

toxic

chemicals is the 'infliction of...harm, an invasion of a legally
protected interest.111

Id. at 317.

Furthermore, "The injury...

is an event that has surely occurred; it is not a speculative or
remote

possible

happening.

Among

the

consequences

of this

unconsented-to invasion ... a tangible risk of major disease."
Id. at

319.

Appellants1 exposure to asbestos in this case is a

tortious event that surely has occurred.

Asbestos is the toxic

invader and the defendants are responsible for the unconsented-to
exposure and resulting injuries.
This view of injuries is also supported by Friends for All
Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C.
Cir.

1984).

Medical

surveillance

damages

were

awarded

to

children who were exposed to the sudden depressurization of an
aircraft cabin.
that

an

The Court wrote, "It is difficult to dispute

individual

has

an

interest

in

avoiding

expensive

diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in
avoiding physical injury."

Id. at 826.

In addition to an invasion of Appellants1 legal interests of
avoiding

emotional

expensive

distress,

diagnostic

examinations,

actual physical injury.
cancer

or

diagnosed

increased

risk

of

Appellants

disease

have

and

suffered

Although Appellants do not yet have

asbestosis,

they

have

been

exposed

to

asbestos, suffered respiratory distress and other reactions, and
as a result have suffered an immediate injury.

The Court in

Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th cir.
1985), held that mere exposure to asbestos was sufficient to
17

establish an "injury" in the form of "inhalation of fibers and
the invasion of his body by those fibers".

Id. at 1137,

In Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn.
1982) , the court held that mere ingestion of contaminated water
was an

injury, although the plaintiffs

symptoms from drinking the toxic water.

suffered

no physical

The court stated, "If

the plaintiffs ingested any amount of the toxic substance, it is
the judgment of the court that
physical injury."

Id. at 434.

it is at least a technical

In the present case, Appellants

have inhaled a toxic substance over the course of months; they
have incurred an injury.

Appellants should now be allowed to

recover for that injury.
Another theory adopted by some courts for finding present
injury when the plaintiff has no symptoms of cancer or asbestosis
is that exposure to toxic substances results in subcellular and
genetic injuries.

This was the position of the Court in Brafford

v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp 14 (D.C. Colo. 1984), where
factual allegations of cellular and subcellular damage satisfied
the present injury requirement for an increased risk of cancer
claim.

Brafford was a case of exposure to known carcinogens with

no present physical injuries.

The Federal District Court of

Colorado in Brafford also found that a material issue of fact
existed as to the presence of such cellular injuries precluding
summary judgment.

586 F.Supp. at 18.

It is an established

medical fact that once the toxic asbestos fibers enter the body
they remain there forever.

L. Gordy & R
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. Gray, supra at

205C.11(2).

"Indeed,

asbestosis,

caused

by

inhalation

of

asbestos fibers, begins when asbestos fibers become embedded in
the lung11.

Eacrle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517,

527, (Fla. App. Dist. 1985) citing Todd Shipyard Corp v. Black,
717 F.2d 1280, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1983).

In the present case,

Appellants have also been exposed to a known carcinogen.

The

cellular level injuries sustained by the Appellants have yet to
be established, but they have undoubtedly occurred.

Just as in

Brafford, this Court must recognize the subcellular and genetic
injuries as a present injury.

This injury resulted from the

Appellants exposure to asbestos at the hands of Mountain Fuel.
Another means by which courts have recognized a present
injury

where

toxic

tort victims

do

not yet have cancer or

asbestosis is explained in Hacrerty v. L & L Marine Services,
Inc., 788 F.2d 315 reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) and
Villari v. Terminex, 663 F.Supp 727 (E.D.Pa. 1987).

In both of

these cases nominal symptoms such as dizziness, general malaise,
headache and nausea were sufficient to establish present injury.
In Haqerty the Plaintiff was a tankerman who was drenched with
known

carcinogenic

chemicals.

He

experienced

the

physical

symptoms of dizziness, leg cramps and a stinging sensation in his
extremities.

Hagerty

brought

suit

seeking

damages

for his

enhanced risk of disease, emotional distress associated with the
fear

of

contracting

cancer,

and

for

the

costs

of

medical

examination to help in early detection of the disease.

The

District Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants.

788

19

F.2d

at

316.

Plaintiffs 1

The Court of Appeals reversed and recognized
claims

surveillance damages.

for

emotional

distress

and

medical

The Court held that these causes of action

were cognizable because plaintiffs's injury was "discernible on
the occasion when he was drenched with the toxic chemicals" and
that he was therefore "entitled to recover damages for all of his
past,

present

and

probable

defendant's tortious conduct."

future

harm

attributable

to

Id. at 317.

The Plaintiffs in Villari were exposed to the termicide
Aldin, which is "considered a cancer causing chemical in man",
when it was negligently spilled in their basement.
at

728.

The

Plaintiffs

testified

to physical

663 F.Supp.
symptoms of

headaches, nausea, dizziness and general malaise in the month
after the spill.

Id. at 728.

Concerning the issue of present

physical "injury" from which to recover damages, the court wrote,
"we have found that there is sufficient medical evidence on
record to permit a jury to conclude that the Villaris suffered
physical

injury

from Aldrin exposure".

Id. at 735.

These

general symptoms were sufficient "injury " to support a claim for
medical surveillance damages.
The present case is similar to the issues addressed in
Haaerty and Villari.

Appellants have suffered general symptoms

of asbestos exposure including coughing, wheezing, shortness of
breath,

nausea

Appellants

have

and

headaches,

suffered

a

among

tortious

exposure to a known carcinogen.

other
event;

complaints.
the

The

unconsented

As a result, the Appellants have
20

suffered emotional distress, an increased risk of future disease
and the necessity of medical expenses to monitor the disease
process which began with the invasion of asbestos fibers.
All of the preceding cases represent four theories under
which recovery has been allowed and the "injury" requirement met.
Toxic tort victims face almost insurmountable legal barriers in
bringing suit for exposure to toxic substances.

To recover

damages, courts use the traditional tort doctrine that requires
plaintiffs to plead and prove a present injury.
that

few

toxic

tort

victims

suffer

an

The problem is

immediate, medically

verifiable disease due to the long latency period between the
exposure to the toxin and detection of the disease.

These four

theories represent ways in which the courts have overcome the
present injury barrier, and allowed toxic tort victims to recover
for

their

harms.

See,

Christiansen,

Sterling

v.

Velsicol

Chemical Corp.: Emotional Distress Damages for the Duration of
Toxic Exposure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 759

(1989) ; Note, Medical

Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation
of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 Ind. L. J. 849 (1988).
Because

the

issue

of

toxic

torts

and

the

inherent

characteristics of latent disease manifestation is a relatively
new area of the law, the case law is varied in it's approach to
physical injury.

Whichever theory of recovery this Court favors,

the fact that the Appellants have suffered an injury cannot be
denied.

As

disease...is

Justice

Handler

unquestionably

observed,

greater
21

than

"The

risk

of

major

that

experienced

by

persons not similarly exposed to toxic chemicals".
A.2d at 319.

Ayers, 525

Justice Handler further noted "no person in her

right mind would trade places with any one of these plaintiffs".
Id. at 320.

Indeed Appellants have experienced an injury and

should be compensated.
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III. THE IMMEDIATE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE APPELLANTS ARE
SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE THEM TO COMPENSATION FOR THOSE INJURIES.
Each of the Appellants have clearly testified to and
described

immediate

respiratory

injuries

distress, chest

including

severe

coughing,

tightness, headaches, severe eye

irritations and nausea; all symptoms of having inhaled large
quantities of asbestos fibers.
205C.11(2).

4 L. Gordy & R. Gray, supra,

Asbestos fibers will remain trapped in each of the

Appellant's
asbestosis

lungs
and

lung

forever,

causing

cancer.

Id.

scarring

205C.11(2).

and

possibly

"The injury

involved is an actual event: exposure to toxic chemicals.

The

tortious contamination, moreover, is an event that has surely
occurred; it is not a speculative or remote possible happening.
Among the consequences of this unconsented-to invasion ... is a
tangible risk of a major disease."
Handler, dissenting opinion).
wholly

unconsented-to.

Ayers, 525 A.2d at 319. (J.

The injury in the present case was

The

Appellants

asked

on

numerous

occasions the contents of the 60% asbestos material they were
working with and the resulting dust they were inhaling.

The

Defendants withheld information, and claimed the contents to be
benign.

The Appellants discovered the asbestos through their

own initiative and refused to work with the asbestos once it was
discovered.

Professional asbestos removers, who use protective

clothing, were

subsequently

employed

to remove the hazardous

material.
"But for " the Defendants actions, the Appellants would not
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have been exposed to asbestos and suffered immediate injuries in
the form of their coughing, headaches, nausea and eye irritation.
At a very minimum, Appellants should be compensated for these
immediate injuries.
IV. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVERY FOR INFLICTION OF SEVERE
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND FEAR OF CANCER.
Since

victims

of

asbestos

related

diseases

have

difficulty proving causation and the presence of a compensable
injury, courts frequently allow recovery based on a theory of
mental distress.

Although no Utah Court has ever addressed the

issue of asbestos exposure, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes
causes of action for infliction of severe emotional distress.

A

person "who intentionally causes severe emotional distress to
another through extreme and outrageous conduct is liable to that
person for any resulting damages."
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985).
required.

Pentecost v. Harward,

699

Neither bodily nor physical injury is

Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).

Recently,

Utah

has

recognized

a

cause

negligent infliction of emotional distress.
763 P. 2d 771 (Utah 1988).

of

action

for

Johnson v. Rogers,

Indeed, application of the tests set

out by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson justify recovery for
infliction of emotional distress in this case.

In Johnson, the

Utah Supreme Court adopted a "zone of danger" rule.
P.2d at 778-784.

Johnson, 763

In adopting the zone of danger rule, the Court

relied upon §313 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts:
(1)
If the actor unintentionally causes
emotional distress to another, he is subject to
24

liability to the other for resulting
bodily harm if the actor

illness or

(a)
should have realized that his
conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing
the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the
harm or peril of a third person, and (b)
from
facts known to him, should have realized that the
distress, if it were caused, might result in
illness or bodily harm.
Johnson, 763 P.2d at 780.
In

the

present

case

Defendants

were

negligent

in

allowing Appellants to work in an enclosed, poorly ventilated
area with a known carcinogenic material and have thereby
caused

Plaintiffs1

emotional

distress.

Defendants had a

"duty" to provide Appellants with a work place free from
known hazards.

Defendants were under the "duty to warn them

of any danger in coming thereon which he knows of or ought to
know of, and of which they are not aware.

One going upon

anotherfs property as an independent contractor

... is an

invitee to whom the property owner is liable for an injury
occasioned

by

the

unsafe

encountered

in the work."

condition

of

the

premises

41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent

Contractors §27 (1964).
Defendants breached that duty when they told Appellants,
despite

repeated

inquiries,

that

the material

they were

forced to work in and inhale was a benign calcium silicate
when in fact it was toxic asbestos.
Mountain
workspace.
asbestos,

Fuel

property

and

The asbestos was on the

contaminated

the

Appellants

Defendants knew or should have known about the
particularly

in

light
25

of

the

claim

that

all

asbestos had been previously removed.

It cannot seriously be

disputed that Defendants were aware of the risks posed by
asbestos

and

Mountain

Fuel

insulating

knew

that

should

material

the building

have
was

been

on

asbestos

contained
the

and

alert

provided

asbestos.
that

the

adequate

protection and warnings to the workers.
Defendants1

negligence

in failing to provide a safe

workplace is the proximate cause of Appellants1 emotional
distress.

"But for" Defendants1 negligence, Appellants would

not be suffering from the emotional distress of having been
exposed to harmful and potentially deadly toxins.
The "zone of danger" rule is met by the facts in the
instant case.

The Defendants should have realized that their

conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress,
because of their knowledge of the potential harm.

Defendants

knew of the potential harms related to asbestos exposure.
From the facts generally known about asbestos, the Defendants
should have realized

that

such distress might result in

illness or bodily harm to Appellants.
A

more

satisfied

stringent
by

rule,

Appellants

"the

in

the

impact

rule", is also

instant

case.

In

Eaqle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) , the "impact rule" satisfied the showing
of a physical
distress.
asbestos

injury required for recovery for emotional

In Eaqle-Picher the plaintiff had been exposed to
products.

The

Court
26

determined

that

mere

"inhalation of asbestos satisfies the impact rule".
527.

Id. at

The Court wrote, "The essence of the impact, then, it

seems is that the outside force or substance, no matter how
large or small, visible or invisible, and no matter that the
effects are not immediately deleterious, touch or enter the
plaintiff's body."

Id.

A plaintiff, therefore, need not

show physical injury, just exposure to a toxic substance, in
order to recover damages.

Id.

The court reached this

conclusion by reasoning that inhalation of smoke has been
sufficient injury and invasion to constitute an impact.
at 526.

Id

It was further noted that, "surely, the embedding of

asbestos fibers in the lungs is no less an impact than the
microscopic

intrusion of tubercule bacilli into the body

found to have satisfied the impact rule in Plummer v. United
States."

Id. at 527

(citation omitted).

Clearly, the

inhalation of asbestos fibers satisfies the "impact rule".
Victims
infliction

of

of

toxic

emotional

torts

recovered

distress

in the

for
recent

negligent
case of

Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. , 274 Cal. Rptr. 885
(Cal. App. 6 Dist. 1990).

In Potter, property owners sued

when they discovered hazardous materials dumped nearby had
contaminated their water supply.

The Potter court held that

plaintiffs could "recover for NIED [Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress] even in the absence of physical injury."
Id. at 890, relying on Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980).
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The

Potter Court said that the "essence" of plaintiffs distress
"is that a cancer-causing substance has entered their bodies
and therefore made them more susceptible to future physical
injury.

In other words the security of their person has been

jeopardized"

274 Cal. Rptr. at 891.

In regards to the issue

of unsubstantiated claims, the court said, "it is apparent
that

these

provide
genuine."

a

circumstances
certain

[exposure

guarantee

that

to

toxic

substances]

respondents1

fear

is

Id.

Many courts have granted relief to toxic tort victims
for emotional distress.

Haqerty v. L.& L. Marine Serv..

Inc. , 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986);
Elec. Corp.,684 F.Supp. 852

Merry v. Westincrhouse

(M.D.Pa. 1988);

University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553

Wetherill v.

(N.D.I11. 1983);

Villari v. Terminix Intern., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.Pa.
1987) ;
The

Courts

have

also

allowed

victims

of

asbestos

exposure to prove emotional distress from exposure based upon
(1) Cancerphobia
Both

theories

and
of

(2) the fear of contracting cancer.
mental

distress

seek

to

avoid

the

traditional common law requirement of present physical injury
as a condition precedent to a personal injury action.
Cancerphobia, a recognized psychiatric illness, is the
present anxiety over developing cancer in the future.

Gayle

and Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of
Cancer, 15 Cum. L. Rev. 723, 730 (1985).
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Many Courts have

recognized
distress.

cancerphobia

as

evidence

of

severe

emotional

Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499

(N.J. Super. 1985).

Recovery for cancerphobia was first

recognized in Ferrara v. Gallucio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d
249,

176

N.Y.S.2d

996

(1958).

Ferrara

was

a

medical

malpractice action wherein the Plaintiff recovered for her
emotional

distress

stemming

from her

cancerphobia.

152

N.E.2d at 251.
The New Jersey Court in Devlin set out four standards to
be met in determining recoverability for cancerphobia or a
fear of cancer claim.
(1)
Plaintiff is currently suffering from
serious fear or emotional distress or a clinically
diagnosed phobia of cancer.
(2)
The fear was
proximately caused by exposure to asbestos.
(3)
Plaintiff's fear of getting cancer due to their
exposure is reasonable.
(4)
Defendants are
legally responsible for Plaintiff's exposure to
asbestos.
Devlin, 495 A.2d at 499.
A. Appellants Are Currently Suffering From Serious Fear or
Emotional Distress.
It is clear from the testimony of each of the
Appellants in their depositions as well as their Responses to
Interrogatories that each Appellant suffers severe emotional
distress

from

the

fear

of developing

future

cancer and

asbestos related disease.
B.
The Fear Was Proximately Caused By Appellant's Exposure
To Asbestos At The Mountain Fuel Site.
Such

fears

include

the

fear

of

contraction of

mesothelioma, a fatal cancer, which is exclusively caused by
29

asbestos.

But for Appellants' exposure to asbestos at the

Mountain Fuel site, the Appellants would not be suffering
emotional distress regarding an increased fear of contraction
of cancer and/or asbestos related disease.
C.
Appellants' Fear of Contracting Cancer As A Result Of
Their Exposure To Asbestos At The Mountain Fuel Site Is
Reasonable.
It is clear from the Statement of Facts supra that the
level of exposure to asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site was
unconscionably high.

It is common knowledge that asbestos is

a known carcinogen and that asbestosis and mesothelioma are
feared

throughout

the

country.

Considering

the heinous

consequences of contraction of an asbestos related disease,
it is certainly reasonable that Appellants fear contracting
such diseases.
D.
Defendants
Exposure.

Are

Legally

Responsible

For Appellants'

As the owner of the building and the employer of the
contractor and subcontractors at the project, Mountain Fuel
had a legal responsibility to protect Appellants from being
exposed to substances which are known to cause debilitating
disease and death.
Mountain

Fuel's

There is no justification whatsoever for

failure

to

advise

Appellants

and

employers of the asbestos at the Mountain Fuel site.

their
This is

especially true given the fact that Appellants brought the
material containing over 60% asbestos to the attention of
Mountain

Fuel's

employees

and
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agents

early

on

and were

assured that it was merely calcium silicate.
not

(because

they

cannot) deny

legal

Defendants do

responsibility

for

Plaintiffs1 exposure to the asbestos in this case.
Numerous cases have allowed recovery for fear of cancer
and/or cancerphobia.

Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 542

A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. Ad. 1988);
Corp.,

495

A.2d

495

Devlin v. Johns-Manville

(N.J. Super. I

1985);

Eagle-Picher

Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 S.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
Genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary
judgment on Appellants1 claim for emotional distress.

The

extent of Appellants' past and current emotional distress and
its source is an issue to be resolved by the trier of fact as
well as the reasonableness of such fears.

The Molien Court

stated, "the jurors are best situated to determine whether
and to what extent the defendants conduct caused emotional
distress...To

repeat:

presented

the

to

this

trier

of

is

a matter

fact."

of proof

616

P.2d

at

to be
821.

Additionally, material issues of fact exist as to the level
of exposure at the Mountain Fuel site and the degree of
inhalation and ingestion of asbestos by Appellants.

"It is

for the Jury to decide questions such as the existence,
severity and reasonableness of the fear."
at 318.

Hagerty, 788 F.2d

Consequently, Summary Judgment for Defendants should

be reversed, and the Appellants should be given their day in
court.
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V.
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF THEIR EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS.
The
diseases

is

early

detection

considered

by

of

carcinogenic-exposure

the vast majority

of medical

authorities to be essential in the effective treatment of
disease and enhances the victim's chances of survival.

Evers

v. Dollinger, 9 N.J. 399, 424 & n.2, 471 A.2d 405, 419 & n.2
(1984).
result

Courts have noted the irreparable harm that may
from

delayed

diagnosis

and

treatment.

Barth v.

Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. , 661 F. Supp. 193, (N. D. Cal.
1987) .

Early detection is accomplished by periodic testing

and screening of individuals exposed to toxic substances.
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J.

at 599 n. 12, 525

A. 2d at 309 n.12.

Courts have held that these damages are

not

They

speculative.

are

based

on

objectively,

specifically, determinable medical necessities.

and

Id. at 312.

A recent line of cases has established three elements
which

the

surveillance

plaintiff

must

damages.

prove

These

three

suggested in Ayers, 525 A. 2d at 313
by Merry

to

recover

medical

requirements

were

and were later followed

v. Westincrhouse Elec. Corp. , 684 F.Supp. 847, 850

(M.D.Pa. 1988),

Habitants Against Landfill Toxants v. City

of York, No. 84-5-3820, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20937 (York Co. May
20, 1985) and Villari v. Terminix, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 727, 735
n. 5 (E.D.Pa.1987).

These elements are: "(1) Exposure to

hazardous substances; (2) the potential for injury; and (3)
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the need for early detection."

Merry, 684 F.Supp. at 850.

It is really not disputed that Appellants have been
exposed to a hazardous substance through the negligence of
the Defendants.

For purposes of Defendants1

Motion for

Summary Judgment, Defendants have admitted that Appellants
were exposed to asbestos on their property.

(See, Tr. 1-2).

As a proximate result of their exposure to asbestos,
Appellants have a substantially increased risk of manifesting
a serious asbestos related disease requiring them to undergo
medical

surveillance

examinations.

This element is more

difficult to prove because the medical community is unable to
quantify the risks toxic exposure plaintiffs face.
684 F.Supp. at 850-851.

Merry,

The Merry Court wrote extensively

concerning this issue and arrived at the same standard that
the

Ayers

court

established.

Ayers

states

that

any

increased risk is sufficient to justify medical surveillance
damages.

The Court wrote, "Even if the likelihood that these

plaintiffs would contract cancer were only slightly higher
than

the

national

average, medical

completely appropriate."
potential

diseases

intervention

may

Ayers, 525 A. 2d at 312.

for which

the Appellants

now

be
The

run an

increased risk are extremely serious and life threatening.
Cancer, asbestosis and mesothelioma are the common deadly
results of exposure to asbestos.
"As to the third requirement, there is not a serious
question of the value of early detection and the treatment of
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cancer."

Merry, 684 F.Supp. at 850.

"A survey of the

medical literature indicated that it is universally agreed
that

delay

in

cancer

diagnosis

increases the risk of metastasis."

and

treatment

usually

Evers, 471 A. 2d at 405.

Consequently, there is no doubt whatsoever that Appellants
have a desperate need to detect any asbestos related disease
as early as possible.
Appellants may

also recover under another theory of

compensation for future medical surveillance damages because
their

legally

protected

interest

in

avoiding

medical

surveillance expenses has been invaded by the Defendants.
"But for" the Appellants1 exposure to asbestos, they would
not require medical surveillance.

While this injury is not

an actual physical injury, it is no less an invasion of a
legally protected

interest justifying compensation.

This

position is strongly supported by Friends for All Children,
Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where
the court awarded surveillance damages absent a manifested
physical injury.

The Court stated:

It is difficult to dispute that an individual
has an interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic
examinations just as he or she has an interest in
avoiding physical injury.
When the defendant
negligently invades this interest, the injury to
which is neither speculative nor resistant to
proof, it is elementary that the defendant should
make the plaintiff whole by paying for the
examinations."
Friends,

746

F.2d

at

826.

Future

medical

damages

compensation, without a present physical injury was similarly
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upheld in Hagertv v. L & L Marine Services, Inc. where the
plaintiff was soaked with chemicals while on duty.

He was

awarded the costs of future diagnostic checks and medical
examinations to ensure the early detection of a possible
cancerous condition.

788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).

The Arizona Appellate Court found surveillance damages
necessary and applicable to asbestos exposure in Burns v.
Jacpaays Min. Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d. 28 (Ariz. App.
1987) .

In Burns, residents were exposed to asbestos but

showed no clinically manifested
disease.
the

signs of asbestos-related

The Court recognized the increased risk of disease

plaintiff

faced,

however,

and

awarded

medical

surveillance damages.

The Court stated that "surveillance to

monitor

of

the

effects

exposure

reasonable and necessary."

to

toxic

chemicals

is

Burns, 156 Ariz, at 381, 752

P.2d. at 33.
Many

other

Courts

have

upheld

damages for toxic tort victims.

surveillance

Herber v. Johns-Manville

Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986);
Chemical Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d

Medical

Askey v. Occidental

242, 102 A.D.2d 130 (1984);

Mauro v. Owens-Cornincr Fibercrlas Corp., 225 N.J.Super. 196,
542 A.2d 16

(1988);

Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp.. 202

N.J.Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985);

Barth v. Firestone

Tire and Rubber Co. , 661 F. Supp. 193, (N. D. Cal. 1987).
Medical surveillance damages have been upheld by courts
because

of

the

strong

medical
35

and

legal justifications.

Additionally, Courts recognize the compelling public policy
interests of just compensation for victims, deterrence and
early disease detection.
Allowing

recovery

for

medical

surveillance

damages

fulfills the tort system's deterrent function by subjecting
tort feasors to immediate and significant liability.
106 N.J. at 579, 525 A. 2d at 311-12.
in

recovering

damages when

itself lessens.
behavior.

the

Avers,

The victims difficulty

latent

disease manifests

Such recoveries also deter irresponsible

Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation,

99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1630 (1986).

"The primary purpose of

the tort law is that wronged persons should be compensated
for their injuries and that those responsible for the wrong
should bear the cost of their tortious conduct.

Moreover,

forcing tort feasors to pay for the harm they have wrought
provides a proper incentive for reasonable conduct....

Those

who cause injuries should be required to pay for them."
Ayers 106 N.J. at

Awarding

585, 525 A.2d at 319 (citation omitted).

medical

surveillance

damages

furthers

the

public interests of early detection and treatment of disease.
Early

detection

personal

benefits

injuries they

Defendants1 liability.
311-312.

the

suffer

victims

by

mitigating

the

and ultimately reduces the

Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525 A.2d at

Early detection also fosters public health interest

in providing "access to medical testing for individuals whose
exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced
36

risk of

disease.

The value of early diagnosis and treatment for

cancer patients is well documented."

Burns, 156 Ariz, at

382, 752 P.2d at 33. Additionally, the lack of reimbursement
for

toxic

exposure

unjustly

effects

the

individual

and

offends public policy, because a victim who does not have the
financial means for medical
forego diagnostic testing.

intervention must necessarily
Ayers, 106 N.J.at 579, 525 A.2d

at 311.
Diagnostic testing may also be required by law in order
to recover for the

future diseases appellants develop.

The

•avoidable consequence rule1 requires that a plaintiff submit
to any treatment that is medically advisable.

"Failure to do

so rna^ bar future recovery for a condition he could thereby
have alleviated or avoided."
A.2d

at

310-311.

Ayers, 106 N.J. at 579, 525

Appellants

exposure

to

asbestos

has

increased their risk of contracting serious disease sometime
in

the

future.

"But

for"

Appellant's

unconsented-to

exposure, they would not have the greatly increased risk of
contracting asbestosis or mesothelioma.
Appellants

claim

medically

advisable

substances.

that

pre-symptom
for

A. 2d at 18.
create

diagnostic

plaintiffs

exposed

testing
to

is

toxic

Merry, 684 F.Supp. at 851; Askey, 477 N.Y.S.2d

at 247, 102 A.d.2d at 137;

to

Case law supports

a

requirements

Mauro, 225 N.J.Super at 198, 542

There is sufficient evidence before the court
genuine
for

issue

recovering

of

material

medical
37

fact

as to the

surveillance damages,

including Appellants1 increased risk of major disease and the
necessity of medical monitoring.

Consequently, Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed and Appellants
should be allowed to pursue their claims further.

X.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it is clear that numerous genuine
issues of material fact exist in this case precluding summary
judgment.
injury

It is also clear that Appellants have suffered an

for which they are entitled to compensation as a

matter of law.

It is undisputed that Appellants were exposed

to clouds of toxic asbestos on the property of Mountain Fuel.
As a result of this unconsented-to exposure, Appellants have
suffered invasion of their legally protected interests and
their bodies.

Appellants suffer from the increased risk of

fatal disease and reasonable emotional distress.
are

entitled

to

damages

for

these

injuries

Appellants
including

compensation for the necessary costs of medical monitoring.
This case presents many issues of material fact, and this
Court should now reverse and remand this case to the lower
court for further proceedings.
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